--- title: "Job guarantees in Austria, France and India: employment effects, cost per job, and the designs that trap people" kind: "Article" topic: "Economics" date: "2026-10-10" url: "https://canopticon.com/articles/job-guarantees-in-austria-france-and-india" author: "Chris Telford" license: "CC BY 4.0" --- Imagine an app that, like a ride-hailing app, always has a paid job waiting for anyone who wants one — repairing a building, tending a park, helping in a care home. It sounds like a policy from a novel. The research behind this article found that every part of it has already been tried somewhere, and that the results are clear enough to argue from. ## It already exists, in pieces The idea has a name, and a track record: Job-guarantee and public-works programs are real and well studied. What has not been built is the whole thing at once. None of them combines a guarantee with an Uber-style app where you accept offers on demand. Economists have designed the national version on paper. One institute calls a job guarantee "a public option for jobs," and its American model projects 11–16 million enrollees and costs of $378–$415 billion a year. A rival design estimates "a total annual program cost of $543 billion, or just under 3 percent of GDP," and the research is clear about their status: These are model projections, not observed results. ## The closest thing to an on-demand version is a city van The nearest real-world version of tap-to-accept public work is an American city programme. In Albuquerque, a van picked up panhandlers for a five-hour shift of city beautification, paid $9/hour (about $45) in cash the same day, and connected them to services. The city reports 6,666 jobs provided since September 2015, and other cities copied it. Its record on moving people on is thinner: 309 participants, 17 employed and 5 housed at one early count. The research draws one firm lesson from it: Albuquerque proved that immediacy drives uptake. ## In one Austrian town, it ended long-term unemployment From 2020 to 2024, the town of Gramatneusiedl offered a job to every resident who had been out of work for a long time. The evaluation found "strong positive impacts" on employment, income, security, social recognition, time structure and collective purpose. And nobody turned it down: Everyone offered a job after the two-month preparatory phase accepted it. It was small, and the research is careful about what that means: The pilot was tiny, though (the first wave was 31 people), so it proves feasibility, not national scalability. Austria has decided the result was worth more than a pilot; the government has since committed €50 million to extend the model. ## In France, at scale, it worked — and cost money France has run its version since 2016, hiring long-term unemployed people on permanent contracts at the minimum wage, in work that does not compete with local businesses. The official evaluation found a +74 percentage-point causal effect on employment over 24 months. It also put a price on it: a net public cost of €11,300–€13,700 per full-time job per year, far from the break-even its backers had promised. This is the best Western evidence on both halves of the trade-off: it works, and it isn't free. It is no longer small. By the end of 2024 the experiment covered 83 territories, 86 such enterprises and 3,290 people, and the official cost finding was blunt: "far from the budget neutrality originally promised." A parliamentary amendment drafted with the programme's backers puts the human result in one line: "6,000 people have left long-term unemployment thanks to the project in 83 territories." ## In India, it raised wages for everyone The largest version is a legal right. It is a legal right to 100 days of unskilled paid work per rural household, and it reached 51 million households in 2016. Its effects spread beyond the people in it: Imbert and Papp found that it crowded out private employment roughly one-for-one and raised rural wages about 5%. A public job that is always available puts a floor under every private one. A later experiment found the wage effect was most of the benefit. When the programme was run better, 86% of the resulting income gains came from non-program earnings, meaning higher private wages and employment. The research states the conclusion plainly: So a credible public job offer sets a wage floor that private employers must match. Supporters call that the point; critics call it the cost. Other countries show how fast it can be done. South Africa's stimulus programme has created more than 1.5 million work and livelihood opportunities. Most of them went to young people, and the research concludes: It shows a government can scale public employment within months when there is political will. Argentina's emergency programme after 2001 reached many women and raised a familiar worry: local and movement-based administration raised patronage concerns. ## Done badly, it becomes a trap Not every scheme helps people move on. Generic public-employment schemes are the *least* effective active labour-market policy at moving people into regular jobs. Some, like Hungary's, became low-wage traps. The difference is not whether the job exists but what it leads to. Design decides whether it's a springboard or a holding pen. Hungary is the clearest warning. Its public work paid around HUF 50,000 a month against a minimum wage of HUF 73,815. The outcomes were poor: Only 13.8% of participants moved into the regular labour market in 2014. Researchers found that mayors using placements as patronage in poor areas was part of the pattern. Canada has its own version of the brand damage: Ontario's work-for-welfare placements, studies found, often failed to lead to jobs and supplied "subsidized and cheap labour" to agencies. The large reviews give the overall picture. A meta-analysis of 199 estimates from 97 studies found that "public sector employment programmes are less effective" than job-search help or training, while its update found larger effects for the long-term unemployed and in recessions, which is exactly a guarantee's target group and timing. ## The app half already exists, in the private sector Tapping to accept a shift is an ordinary private service. The research lists the platforms that do it, from Instawork to Indeed Flex, and the split that matters among them: Indeed Flex, Bluecrew and WorkWhile employ workers as W-2 employees, with taxes withheld and some benefits. Wonolo and most delivery apps use 1099 contractors. Ontario's new law for platform workers guarantees minimum wage only for "engaged" time from accepting a task to completing it, which leaves waiting unpaid. What nobody has done is put the guarantee behind the app: No government runs a gig-style public-work app of this kind that I could find. ## Making it compulsory for prisoners is the weakest part The idea is sometimes extended to people in prison, and that is where the evidence turns against it. Canada already ties prison work to discipline: refusing work "without reasonable excuse" is a disciplinary offence, and pay is very low; the prison ombudsman puts take-home pay at "about 46 cents an hour" for the most common level. International law draws a hard line: prisoners may not be "hired to or placed at the disposal of private individuals, companies or associations." What reduces reoffending is not forced output. The strongest causal evidence is Norwegian, where rehabilitation-focused prison cut reoffending by 29 percentage points over five years, and the research names the mechanism: The mechanism was training and reintegration, not forced output. Work programmes after release help for a while; one cut recidivism 16–22% in an MDRC randomized trial. The effect did not last: Its employment gains faded after a year > **Objection: It costs too much** > > It costs real money — France's figure is around €12,000 a job a year. But that is set against what long-term unemployment already costs in benefits and lost health, and against what Gramatneusiedl measured: income, security and purpose all up. The honest version of the case is not that it pays for itself; it is that it buys something worth the price. > > The critics' case is about who pays besides the state. One think tank argues an American guarantee would impose a "massive" cost shock on low-wage employers. The research sets the most consistent finding against it: The strongest, most consistent finding is non-economic. Structure, recognition and social contact improve sharply ## What this explains It explains why a guaranteed job keeps returning as an idea despite sounding utopian: where it is tried, people take the jobs and their lives improve. It explains why governments hesitate — it is not free, and the savings promised for it have not appeared. And it shows where the open question really is. Not whether a job guarantee can work, but how to design one that leads somewhere: real work, fair pay, and a path into an ordinary job. The piece nobody has built is the simplest to describe — a guarantee you can accept like a ride.